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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN

M&A

TRANSACTIONS
Umakanth Varotti*

The growing importanceof M&A has coincided with a spurt in concerns over
Corporate Governance issues. However, there has been little analysis of the
clash between the two. In this essay, Mr. Varottil studies the anatomy of an
M&A transactionthrough the lens of governance mechanisms, noting how
pulls and pressures within a company affect the viability of a deal. He notes
that 'mature and sophisticated'structurescan minimize the risk of an M&A
transaction.Further,he considers whether the existing legal framework in
India allaysfears ofmisgovernance,and suggests that thereare several aspects
that require reconsiderationfrom both the regulatorsand the corporatesector.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This essay traverses two significant topics, that of corporate governance and
mergers & acquisitions (M&A), each of which commands great attention on a
stand-alone basis, having hogged the limelight in the business sphere at least for
the last quarter of a century, if not more. However, less light has been shed on the
intersection between corporate governance and M&A, at least in the Indian context.
This essay focuses on what lies at the cusp of these two well-known phenomena.
Corporate governance and M&A enjoy a symbiotic relationship, mutually
feeding off each other. First,M&A induces the necessary incentives in companies to
enhance their governance practices. The concept of a market for corporate control
suggests that poorly governed companies would automatically become targets
for acquisitions, particularly in efficient markets which will accordingly impose a
discount in the market price of the stock. The existence of such a possibility will,
in itself, impel companies to boost their governance structures and practices, in
order to avoid being taken over.' As one analogy, albeit infamous, goes: "It is like
riding a tiger, not knowing how to get off without being eaten."2 Even in a global
context, the available evidence indicates that in cross-border M&A, the corporate
governance regimes of all the companies involved tend to get elevated to reflect
that of the company which has the highest standards, particularly if that were the
acquirer or the resulting company from the M&A transaction.3
Second, the causative factors operate in the reverse direction as well, in
that better corporate governance practices employed while undertaking M&A
transactions enhance the value of the deal to the companies' shareholders as well
as other stakeholders.4 Corporate governance also acts as a set of checks and

1

Henry G. Manne, Mergersand the Marketfor CorporateControl, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965);
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The ProperRole of a Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1980-1981).

2

Letter dated January 7, 2009 from B. Ramalinga Raju, Chairman, Satyam Computer
Services Ltd. to the Board of Directors, Satyam Computer Services Ltd.
Arturo Bris, Neil Brisley & Christos Cabolis, Adopting better corporate governance:
Evidence from Cross-BorderMergers, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 224 (2008); Marina Martynova &
Luc Renneboog, Spillover of corporate governance standards in cross-border mergers and
acquisitions, 14 J.CORP. FIN. 200 (2008); Cong Wang & Fei Xie, Corporate Governance
Transfer and Synergistic Gainsfrom Mergers and Acquisitions, 22(2) REV. FINANC. STUD.
829 (2009).
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Elijah Brewer III, William E. Jackson III & Julapa A. Jagtiani, Corporate Governance
StructureandMergers (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Working Paper No. 10-26,
2010) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1666238.
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balances that aims to prevent companies from entering into value-reducing deals.5
This essay will deal with this set of mechanisms in some detail before commenting
upon some of the legal trends in India.

II. CORPORATE

GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS

An M&A transaction is a significant event in the life of a company. Although
there are several economic and business drivers for why companies would embark
upon M&As, concerns have been expressed about issues such as managerial hubris,
overconfidence and the winner's curse that may motivate companies to enter into
M&A deals that should have been avoided, or where they ought not to have paid
a price so handsome.6 These issues are magnified in competitive bid or auction
situations where the acquirer's CEO are likely to display overconfidence in the
value of the deal. Matters take on a more serious tone in cases where concerns
of confidentiality and the demands of speed prevent a wider consultation of
stakeholders, who will have no choice but to reconcile themselves with the decision
of the CEO and the top-management team. A mature and sophisticated governance
structure within these companies would certainly minimize the risk of failed M&As.
A number of well-established governance mechanisms operate in the context
of M&A, both domestic and cross-border.
A. Board of Directors
To begin with the board of directors, reviewing the merits and disadvantages
of an M&A transaction constitutes an important area of board decision-making. In
terms of the corporate governance environment, these are turbulent times indeed
and never before have the actions of the board been subject to such strict scrutiny,
given the lessons from the global financial crisis and a fair share of corporate
governance scandals, both in India and elsewhere. A "rubber stamping" board is

5

6
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James K. Donaldson, You Can Come Under the TARP, But First ... The Bank of America
-Merrill Lynch Merger Was a Failureof Corporate Governance, 9 FLA. ST. U. Bus. REv. 21
(2010).
Donald C. Langevoort, The Behavioral Economics of Mergers and Acquisitions, 12
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. Bus. L. 65 (2011); Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesisof Corporate
Takeovers, 59 J. Bus. 197 (1986).
Martin Lipton & Andrew J. Nussbaum, Corporate Governance and Cross-BorderM&A:
Key Challenges and Responsibilities, Third International Conference "Global Capital
Markets and Corporate Governance: Quest for Global Standards", Moscow May 31June 1, 2012, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2115535.
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surely a thing of the past. A board must not only have acted, but must be seen to
have acted, thereby lending credence to the actual process followed.
How does the board discharge the role of enhancing shareholder value? First,
the board is called upon to provide strategic inputs. For example, whether the deal
fits well within the company's overall strategy. Essentially, it is a sounding-board of
sorts. This aspect is fairly well-understood. Second, and more importantly, the board
performs a monitoring function. In any M&A transaction, the key questions the
board must generally ask are: What are the findings of a due diligence conducted
on the target? Have they been adequately addressed in the transaction structure
and legal documentation? How has the valuation been arrived at? Is it fair to
the shareholders? And so on and so forth. Reliance is usually placed on external
advisors' reports in arriving at the board's own decision. In fact, it is good practice
for boards to obtain independent advice on large and complex M&A transactions.
A related aspect is that the role and involvement of the board varies depending
upon the type of company, particularly in the Indian context. While promoterdriven companies are clearly more aggressive and quick with decision-making on
M&A transactions, companies with diffused shareholding that are professionally
managed can be more process-oriented and bureaucratic. Board members carry
an unenviable burden in both cases as they are either seen as facilitators if they
support the deal or hindrances if they place checks and balances.
B. Risk Management
One area that is acquiring an increasingly important status as the monitoring
role of a board (including in M&A transactions) is risk management. This is
particularly the case in cross-border acquisitions where the acquirer will not only be
subject to an alien legal regime, but also to a different culture. Companies acquiring
overseas targets are presented with unique issues and unusual compliance risks.'
For example, what are the environmental liabilities in a target incorporated in a
jurisdiction which has a plaintiff-friendly regime for tortious claims and successor
liability? Has the target company been in compliance with applicable legislation,
particularly in sensitive areas such as anti-corruption? With multinational acquirers
becoming increasingly conscious of compliance risks under statutes such as the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and the Bribery Act, it is reasonable to
8

See e.g., Cliff Wright & Brian Fenske, Visionary Deal Strategies in an Ever-Changing
M&A Market: Leading Lawyers on Conducting Due Diligence, Negotiating Representations
and Warranties, and Succeeding in a Post-Recession Market, in ASPATORE, M AND A DEAL
STRATEGIES

(2012).
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assume that they would be willing to walk away from transactions where the
target's governance is unclear from a corruption perspective. These are a matter
of concern for global businesses, and understandably so.
C. Board Independence
Since an M&A transaction is crucial to a company, the monitoring function
is required to be carried on in a dispassionate fashion. That is where board
independence comes in. Since managers and controlling shareholders tend to
have an interest in the transaction, either in terms of pecuniary interest or their
emotional entanglement, independent directors are called upon to perform the
role of a "watchdog". The role of the independent directors becomes even more
significant in M&A transactions between related parties. Sound principles of
corporate governance necessitate a greater role for either the audit committee
(which substantially comprises independent directors), or even a separately
constituted special committee of independent directors. This committee must
meet separately in executive sessions to arrive at their views on the transaction in
an impartial manner. The independent directors may even appoint their own set
of advisors different from those appointed by the company. Although this trend
in independently assessing M&A transactions from the point of view of minority
interests has been gradually gaining traction in countries such as India, there is
a need for greater acceptance and popularization of the process. The legislative
process in India seems to be headed in that direction as well with comprehensive
recognition of board independence in the Companies Bill, 2011. Whether that
amounts to regulatory micromanagement of corporate boards or whether board
independence is likely to be effective at all are grave issues, but that is beyond the
scope of this essay.
D. Gatekeepers
External advisors perform a significant gate keeping role, and mitigate the
cognitive biases of corporate decision-makers in M&A transactions.9 Accounting
firms and investment banks are called upon to provide fairness opinions with
increasing regularity.10 Even lawyers have been required to assume the role of
trusted advisors to corporate managers and controlling shareholders who are

9
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Andrew Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583 (2010).
Joan MacLeod Heminway, A More CriticalUse of FairnessOpinions as a PracticalApproach
to the Behavioral Economics of Mergers and Acquisitions, 12 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. Bus.
L. 81 (2011).
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constantly looking for different and better choices that enhance value and minimize
risk.1'
E. Shareholders and Activism
One of the key criticisms of the corporate governance framework is the
lack of outside shareholder participation in decision-making, 2 particularly with
reference to M&A transactions. Retail shareholders are apathetic due to the
miniscule individual shareholding held by them. Institutional shareholders such
as mutual funds have only been recently prodded by SEBI to take an active role
in the decision-making on their portfolio companies." Several Indian financial
institutions that fall within the influence of the Government continue to hold large
stakes in Indian companies, and they generate their own governance complexities.
For example, their decision of whether to support or object to an M&A deal of a
portfolio company may require the blessings of the government, where economic
rationality runs the risk of being clouded by political compulsions. Institutions
within the sphere of government control may necessarily face limitations as to the
independence of their action.
On the flipside, however, India has recently witnessed the emergence of
4
independent proxy advisors, of the kind that the US markets are familiar with.
These advisory firms are playing a major role in advising shareholders, particularly
of the institutional variety, regarding the merits of individual corporate transactions
such as M&As. Such activism among shareholders will be a new force to reckon
with in the M&A markets that were hitherto devoid of shareholder aggregation
mechanisms. Of course, there is a need to ensure that their participation is carefully
measured so that shareholder activism does not go down the slippery slope of
transforming itself to acquire the status of greenmail. Again, it boils down to
identifying the right balance.
After expressing some of these more universal sentiments, this essay will
briefly comment on the state of the law in India on M&A and the extent to which
11
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Marc I. Steinberg, Counsel Conflict Dilemmas in Mergers and Acquisitions, 47 S. TEX. L.
REv. 3 (2005).
Umakanth Varottil, A Cautionary Tale of the Transplant Effect on Indian Corporate
Governance, 21(1) NAT. L. SCH. IND. R. 1 (2009).
Securities and Exchange Board of India, CircularforMutual Funds: Role of Mutual Funds
in Corporate Governance of Public Listed Companies (March 15, 2010).
Bhuma Shrivastava, Proxy Advisory Firms Give a Boost to ShareholderActivism, THE MINT
(June 29, 2012).
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it does, or does not, take into account corporate governance issues, primarily
with a view to address the concerns of minority shareholders in listed companies.
Transactions involving Indian companies can be divided into three broad categories,
viz. (i) mergers, demergers and corporate restructuring; (ii) takeovers; and (iii)
going-private transactions culminating in squeeze out of minority shareholders.
All of these generate different types of governance issues, and this essay will touch
upon each of them.

III.

MERGERS, DEMERGERS & CORPORATE
RESTRUCTURING

Mergers, demergers and other forms of corporate restructuring are usually
effected through a scheme of arrangement that not only requires the approval of
different classes of shareholders and creditors, but also the sanction of the relevant
court of law. The provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, specifically sections 391 to
394, contain an elaborate framework to give effect to such schemes of arrangement.
This framework has functioned quite well, and it has been used extensively by the
corporate sector in India. Although many other countries in the Commonwealth
too have similar provisions in their corporate statutes that deal with schemes of
arrangement, a broad survey of corporate law in various countries would suggest
that the utilization of these legal provisions in India to effect M&A transactions
far exceeds that in those other jurisdictions. The Indian courts too have played a
pioneering role in developing the jurisprudence on schemes of arrangement, by
clearly laying down the parameters within which such schemes of arrangement
may be initiated, approved by classes of shareholders and creditors and then
accorded the sanction of the court. The landmark decisions of the Supreme Court
in MiheerMafatlal15and HindustanLever 16 have acquired the status of jurisprudential
folklore in M&A.
The popularity of schemes of arrangement in India is understandable due
to the powerful nature of a court-approved scheme. A court order sanctioning
a scheme is often used as a brahmastra (a deadly weapon) to bind dissenting
shareholders and creditors as also against third parties. This, however, also makes
it susceptible to abuses by some who may use schemes of arrangement to achieve

15
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Miheer H. Mafatlal v. Mafatlal Industries Limited, (1996) 87 Comp. Cas. 792 (SC)
[Supreme Court of India].
Hindustan Lever Employees' Union v. Hindustan Lever Limited, AIR 1995 SC 470
[Supreme Court of India].
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ends that are not entirely noble. The lawmaking process has taken cognizance of
this vulnerability and has sought to impose greater restraints on the use of schemes.
For instance, listed companies are now required to obtain fairness opinions from
independent investment banks regarding valuation of the companies involved, and
schemes of arrangement must now comply with applicable accounting standards (a
constraint that had to be imposed to avoid schemes that were initiated purely as a
form of financial reengineering). 7 These and other anti-abuse provisions have also
been introduced in the Companies Bill, 2011 that is pending before the Parliament.
However, this addresses only a part of the concerns. For example, the standard
of disclosures on schemes of arrangement is abysmal. While the Companies Act
requires disclosure of all material facts, 8 the disclosures tend to conceal more than
they reveal. The valuation report is merely a summary, without the accompanying
details of the basis on which the valuation was arrived at. Although the new
requirement of fairness opinions is meant to address this concern, it appears that
the marketplace is still to comprehend the obligations that underpin the issue of
fairness opinions. There is arguably an inadequate supply of specialist professionals
who can issue credible fairness opinions with the required sophistication on
complex M&A transactions.
Other forms of business restructuring that are effected through private
arrangement rather than a court-based scheme raise greater issues regarding
corporate governance. For example, transactions such as asset sales and business
sales are carried out as contractual arrangements with minimal oversight of
minority shareholder interests. Here, and in the absence of a specific governance
framework imposed by law or regulation, the role of the boards of directors
becomes somewhat crucial. This is more so when the transactions are carried out
among group companies. It is too early to exorcise the ghosts of episodes such as the
Satyam-Maytas transaction involving group companies, which have also become
the subject matter of detailed study regarding the attention and involvement of
boards in public listed companies. There is a crucial lacuna in corporate law in this
area, and it relates to the inadequacy and lack of clarity in duties of directors on
corporate boards. The Companies Act itself does not specify duties of directors,
which is left to the domain of common law, and to be moulded by courts through
judicial precedents. This is not unusual, and is in fact quite customary in leading
common law jurisdictions. However, what makes India different is that courts

17
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Clauses 24(f) to (i), The Listing Agreement, clause 24 (f) - (i).
§ 393, Companies Act, 1956.
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have made insufficient use of common law to shape the duties of directors such
as that of care, skill and diligence as well as duties that are fiduciary in nature. A
survey of case law in India indicates that instances where common law duties have
been applied to directors are few and far between. This is unlike other developed
jurisdictions where robustness in the progression of judge-made common law has
generated a sense of clarity and certainty in judging the conduct of directors on
corporate boards, including in the backdrop of large M&A transactions.

IV. TAKEOVERS
Moving on to takeovers, the position of the target's board in a takeover offer
generates a different set of issues. This is because an offer is usually made by the
acquirer to the other shareholders "over the top" of the board. Until recently, the
SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 1997 provided
for a passive target board in that context. The board could, at its option, make
recommendations to shareholders, which was contrary to the position in several
leading jurisdictions in the Commonwealth where boards are obligated to make
recommendations to the shareholders regarding the takeover offer made. More
recent developments seek to address this issue head-on and confer a more active
role to target boards. The new set of regulations issued by SEBI, i.e. the SEBI
(Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 2011, requires
boards to constitute a committee of independent directors to provide reasoned
recommendations to the shareholders that would enable them to make their
decision on whether or not to accept the offer. 19 The independent committee is
also entitled to appoint external advisors such as investment banks, accountants
and lawyers, at the expense of the target company. Once this approach works itself
into the M&A sphere in India, it will introduce a sea-change in the way takeovers
are undertaken in India, and make them less driven by acquirers and possibly the
controlling shareholders.
Moving on to the issue of hostile takeovers, they provide a market for corporate
control and operate as a corporate governance mechanism to keep incumbent
management under check. What role is an Indian target's board expected to play
in such a scenario? Can it build defensive mechanisms to protect the incumbent
board and management? How is the board to assess and measure shareholder value
and thereby demonstrate a proper discharge of its duties? An analysis of the SEBI
takeover regulations leaves open the possibility for hostile takeovers, as Indian

19

Reg. 26(6) - (7), SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 2011.
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boards have minimal powers to build takeover defences in the wake of a hostile
offer. Frustrating actions against takeovers are not permitted without the prior
approval of the shareholders, 2 which is somewhat similar to the position in the
UK, 21 but further distant from the position in the US (in Delaware) where boards are
conferred with greater flexibility in building defences against hostile takeovers. 22 At
present, the debate on hostile takeovers may appear somewhat academic because
most Indian public listed companies have controlling shareholders that make a
hostile takeover a near impossibility.23 However, given the gradual thrust towards
greater liquidity in the Indian stock market and the ongoing dilution of promoter
shareholding that have been occasioned by regulation that mandates a minimum
public float in listed companies, 24 the hostile takeover debate is probably lurking
in the shadows. The role of target boards in that situation requires a more nuanced
approach. For example, one may turn to the role shaped by the Takeover Code in
the UK and directors' common law duty "to actfor properpurpose", 25 as well as the
jurisprudence in Delaware on the board's role in the shadow of a takeover.2 6 The
Indian approach, whether regulatory or judicial, needs to be developed before
hostile takeovers become the hard reality in India too.
V. SQUEEZE OUTS
The final transaction-type, i.e. squeeze out of minority shareholders produces
significant corporate governance issues, particularly straining the relationship
between the controlling shareholders and the minority shareholders. In India,
courts have generally been taking a view that favours squeeze out of minority
shareholders through schemes of arrangement under section 391 and schemes

20
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Reg. 26(1) - (3), SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 2011.
Rule 21.1, Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, The Takeover Code, rule 21.1.
See e.g., Guhan Subramanian, Bargainingin the Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 113 YALE L.
J. 621 (2003).
Shaun Mathew, Hostile Takeovers in India: New Prospects, Challenges, and Regulatory
Opportunities,COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 800 (2007).
Clause 40A, The Listing Agreement read with Rules 19(2)(b) and 19A of the Securities
Contracts (Regulation) Rules, 1957.
Howard Smith v.Ampol Petroleum, [1974] AC 821 [Privy Council]; Hogg v. Cramphorn,
[1967] Ch 254 [High Court (Chancery Division)].
See e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 183-84 (Del. 1986); Air Prods. &
Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011).
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of reduction of capital under section 100 of the Companies Act. 27 Although that
position is somewhat clear as a matter of law, squeeze out transactions are often
found to be under scrutiny if the price offered is challenged before courts. Given that
a squeeze out effectively involves an expropriation of minority shares, corporate
governance demands that the transaction measure up to the dual standards of
28
fairness in process and fairness in price.
As squeeze outs intensify the conflict among shareholders, being the
controlling shareholders and the minority, they touch upon aspects that are at steep
divergence from the principles governing directors. Shareholding in a company
is associated with property rights, 29 entitlements, powers and privileges while
directorship denotes fiduciary duties and responsibilities. Hence, a controlling
shareholder cannot possibly suffer from any conflict of interest in a company law
sense. Such a shareholder may vote at general meetings even on transactions in
which it is interested, with a minority squeeze out being one such. A proposal by
SEBI to the Ministry of Corporate Affairs to introduce the concept of an "interested"
shareholder who should be disallowed from voting on a related party transaction
will, if accepted, signify a paradigm shift in the approach.30 Moreover, company
law does not foist controlling shareholders with duties (such as fiduciary duties).
As a result, they do not owe any duty either to the company or to the minority
shareholders. Although some jurisdictions have embraced the concept of a duty
owed by controlling shareholders to minority shareholders at least in exceptional
transactions such as squeeze outs,3' there is no such move in the Indian context. It is
not known if any proposal in that direction will muster enough momentum to see
the light of day in the near future, but it is important to ensure that such a radical
departure is confined to exceptional situations such as related-party transactions
involving the controlling shareholders or to squeeze outs of minority shareholders.

27
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Sandvik Asia Ltd. v. Bharat Kumar Padamsi, 111(4) Bom L.R. 1421 [Bombay High
Court]; Reckitt Benckiser (India) Ltd., 122 (2005) DLT 612 (Del) [Delhi High Court]; In
re Elpro International Limited, [2009] 149 Comp. Cas. 646 (Bom) [Bombay High Court].
The U.S. courts follow an entire fairness standard that was enunciated in Weinberger
v. UOP Inc., 457 A. 2d 701 (Del. 1983).
§ 82, Companies Act, 1956.
SEBI Press Release, "Recommendation to MCA on related party transactions" (7
February 2011).
Supra note 28.
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V1. CONCLUSION
In sum, giant strides have been taken in the evolution of a legal regime that
engenders M&A transactions, both domestic as well as cross border. Similarly,
the corporate governance framework too has progressively acquired strength.
However, there continue to be areas at the intersection of these two regimes that
merit further attention of the regulators, the legal process and the corporate sector
itself.
This essay has only been able to scratch the surface of this vast topic with a
set of issues that merit greater depth. But, it concludes with the hope that its broad
framework will provide sufficient momentum for an ongoing discourse.

